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Joseph R. Quinn has enjoyed few vacation days since his appointment to the Colorado Supreme Court in 1980 and his selection as Chief
Justice of that court in 1985. He runs twenty miles a week, is raising five
children with his wife Olga, and reads philosophy in his "leisure" time.
With such findings of fact, the conclusion that this is a tireless man
seems unlikely to be set aside upon review. Quinn's energy, dedication,
and fair and scholarly approach to the resolution of legal issues makes
him an ideal member of the judiciary.
Born on November 18, 1932, Joe Quinn grew up in the
Kreighyhead neighborhood of the industrial town of Elizabeth, New
Jersey. His father was a postal inspector, and his mother a homemaker.
He is the eldest of three sons; his brothers teach school and work in
construction. At his father's urging he attended parochial school at St.
Peter's Preparatory. By the time of his graduation, he had all but abandoned his boyhood dream of a career as a major league baseball player
for more academic aspirations. His present work ethic definitely reflects
his "no-nonsense" Jesuit education and training.
ChiefJustice Quinn's college education was interrupted by his service with the Marine Corps during the Korean war. Following his military service, he resumed his liberal arts studies at St. Peter's College,
graduating with honors in 1957. He then entered Rutgers Law School
and completed his distinguished student career with an LL.B. degree in
1961.
Escaping New Jersey, Quinn came to Colorado and clerked for
Supreme Court Justice Leonard v.B. Sutton. Finding the Great West to
his liking, Quinn stayed on to pursue a career in litigation. From January, 1963, to February, 1966, he worked with an insurance defense firm
and engaged extensively in civil litigation.
In the mid-1960's, the birth of public defender programs in Colorado provided a new outlet for his energy. Between February. 1966 and
December, 1969, Quinn worked as a Denver Public Defender. The understaffed office of which he was a part handled all the misdemeanor,
juvenile, and felony cases arising in the Denver courts, plus any appeals
taken in those cases. Despite the sixteen-hour days, he loved the job,
and his devotion to his work became an inspiration to a generation of
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young attorneys working on behalf of the criminally accused. Implementing such newly decided cases as Mapp, Wade, and Miranda, Quinn
had the sense that his work was on the cutting edge of the most important legal developments of the time. He remembers that part of his career as especially exciting and fulfilling.
In January, 1970, the State Public Defender's Office was created by
statute, and Rollie R. Rogers named Quinn as his first Chief Trial Deputy. In that role he spent a year selecting staff, establishing legal procedures for providing assistance of counsel from time of arrest through
appeal, and establishing administrative procedures for accurate record
keeping with respect to case loads and dispositions. As Chief Trial Deputy he had the responsibility for the Boulder, Brighton, Golden, and
Littleton offices and tried several of the more serious cases in those areas. Those who observed Quinn during this period recall him as a
forceful advocate who used his considerable understanding of the developing law to great advantage on behalf of his clients.
He returned to private practice in January of 1971, when he became
a partner in the law firm of Sherman, Quinn and Sherman. There he
continued to litigate until his appointment to the Denver District Court
bench in January, 1973.
As a district court judge, Quinn served in all divisions: criminal,
civil, roving, and domestic. He also presided over a regular grand jury
for a period of time. Additional contributions to the legal community
included service on the Colorado Judicial Planning Committee and the
Standing Committees on Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Criminal
Procedure. He taught criminal procedure at the University of Denver
College of Law for several years and still participates on occasion in programs sponsored by the National Institute of Trial Advocacy.
During his years on the trial bench, Quinn developed a reputation
as being brilliant, fair, and, at times, a bit of a task master. He expected
those around him to exhibit the same dedication and professionalism
that he demanded of himself. Although occasionally exhausted by the
pace he set, those who have worked with him or before him believe
themselves better lawyers for the experience, and remember with fondness the Friday afternoons when official business was concluded, and
conversation turned to past cases, sports, and Thomas Mann.
As a judge, Joseph Quinn has never been one to avoid controversy
by ducking important issues presented in a given case. Although he
considers no one decision of his more significant than another, he acknowledges that his district court decision in Lujan v. Colorado State Board
of Education received the most public attention. In the Lujan case, Judge
Quinn ruled that Colorado's system of financing public education, in
which almost half of the operating income comes from greatly varying
local property taxes, was unconstitutional. He held that the financing
system violated the equal protection provisions of the United States and
Colorado Constitutions and the Colorado constitutional mandate contained in article IX, section 2 that a "thorough and uniform" system of
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public schools be provided. Subsequently, the decision was reversed by
the Colorado Supreme Court in Lujan v. Colorado State Board of
Education.I
In the interim, Governor Lamm had appointed Quinn to that same
court. Although this appointment was applauded by the legal community, the supreme court was picketed the day of Quinn's swearing in.
His ruling as a trial judge in the murder case People v. Lowe had generated significant criticism from the general public. In the highly-publicized case, Lowe had been accused of murdering an eleven-year-old girl
at Denver's Pinehurst Country Club. Judge Quinn granted Lowe's motion to suppress statements and certain physical evidence, finding that
"Do you know why you're here?" constituted interrogation under Miranda, and that a subsequent reading of rights to Lowe did not purge the
taint of the initial illegal questioning. This controversial ruling was up2
held without dissent by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Lowe.
Undaunted by such public criticism, Quinn simply states that he
strives to meet his own standards of quality and does not worry about
his popularity or being reversed. His goal as a judge, a role which he
enjoys, is to make a contribution to the administration ofjustice through
the objective resolution of legal issues.
Quinn's independent thinking is often revealed in his written opinions. For example, in People v. Sporleder,3 the court considered the issue
of whether governmental use of pen registers to record the telephone
numbers dialed by an individual from her home constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Contrary to Smith v. Maryland,4 Quinn
found that a telephone subscriber has a legitimate expectation that the
dialing of telephone numbers from a home phone will be free from governmental intrusion. Stating that the court was not bound by the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment when
determining the scope of state constitutional protections, Quinn's opinion concludes that the use of pen registers without a warrant constitutes
an unreasonable search and seizure.
Continuing in the mode of his law review days, Chief Justice
Quinn's opinions are expansive and scholarly. He holds fast to his belief

that the court has a greater responsibility than simply disposing of cases;
it must also provide the litigants, members of the bar, and the general
public with a full and principled analysis of all significant issues
presented by the case.
Chief Justice Quinn's independence, and his lack of concern that a
given decision will be popular, should not be construed as an indifference toward the public. To the contrary, he voices concern that the
public knows that the court exists for its benefits. He believes it important that the citizenry see its judges as absolutely objective in their deci1.
2.
3.
4.
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Colo. 470, 616 P.2d 118 (1980).
P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983).
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sions. Because the present demands of the court place severe
restrictions on outside activities, Quinn spends less time on committee
work and other projects than in the past.
Often consumed by his work, Chief Justice Quinn is not an easy
man to get to know. However, those fortunate enough to catch a
glimpse of the man behind the impressive work product have seen, at
the least, a very likeable, decent person. It is axiomatic that Joseph
Quinn has been and will continue to be an important jurist. Baseball's
loss has been the judiciary's gain.

